Agency in the Anthropocene: Goethe, Radical Reality, and the New Materialisms by Sullivan, Heather I
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Modern Languages and Literatures Faculty 
Research Modern Languages and Literatures Department 
2016 
Agency in the Anthropocene: Goethe, Radical Reality, and the New 
Materialisms 
Heather I. Sullivan 
Trinity University, hsulliva@trinity.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/mll_faculty 
 Part of the Modern Languages Commons 
Repository Citation 
Sullivan, H.I. (2016). Agency in the Anthropocene: Goethe, radical reality, and the new materialisms. In J.A. 
McCarthy, S.M. Hilger, H.I. Sullivan, & N. Saul (Eds.), The history of embodied cognition 1740-1920: The 
Lebenskraft-debate and radical reality in German science, music, and literature (pp. 285-304). 
doi:10.1163/9789004309036_013 
This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Modern Languages and Literatures 
Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Modern Languages and Literatures 
Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact 
jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
 Agency in the Anthropocene:     
Goethe, Radical Reality, and the New Materialisms 
 
Heather I. Sullivan 
 
Abstract: Our current era has been termed the Age of the “Anthropocene,” or the hu- 
man-inflected geological era. This essay addresses the implications of human impact on 
the Earth as a form of “radical reality” by addressing the broad spectrum of human and 
non-human agency. The analysis follows a three-step process: it begins with an introduc- 
tion to the new materialisms and distributed agency in contrast to Howard Tuttle’s no- 
tion of “radical reality” based on human consciousness. It then explores the agency of 
nature’s “vibrancy” in the debate occurring early in the Anthropocene (during Goethe’s 
lifetime) between “vitalism” and “mechanism.” Finally, I use this context to explore Goe- 
the’s optics as a view that, like the new materialisms, is grounded in the interactivity of 
human and non-human energies. I juxtapose Tuttle’s notion of radical reality with the 
new materialisms via Goethe in order to explore the broader implications of human and 
non-human agency in the age of the Anthropocene. Goethe offers convenient access into 
the Anthropocene with surprisingly prescient insights into what we now see as ecological 
enmeshments within nature’s systems. 
 
 
We are in the Age of the Anthropocene, or the human-inflected geological 
era, as the Nobel Laureate in atmospheric chemistry, Paul Crutzen, an- 
nounced in 2000.1 Since then, many scholars have adopted the term to de- 
scribe the scientifically traceable impact of human activity across the entire 
planet since the Industrial Revolution. With such wide-spread traces and 
changes attributable to human beings, our actions loom ever larger and our 
agency to guide our future seems ever more profound. Debates rage con- 
cerning whether we should engineer the globe intentionally to counter the 
damage, or to try to work within the parameters in which we have evolved 
along with our co-species and thus limit our impact. The sway of human ac- 
tivity on reality seems ever more radical. Yet, at the same time, thinking 
“globally” means that our actual individual agency appears diminished, par- 
ticularly when compared to traditionally humanist assumptions of a self- 
determining rational individual. Hence we face the complex dilemma of nav- 
igating between the vast collective impact of human beings as a species on 
the surface of the earth and climate and an acknowledgement of our limited 
individual agency in the scale of these circumstances. 
In addressing this striking disparity of scale in the context of our ecolog- 
ical enmeshment, I consider our agency as a “distributed” force; that is, it 
 
 
1 Cf. Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 2011). 
  
not so much driven by singular individuals making well-considered choices, 
but rather by a plurality of interactions and impulses from very large groups 
and a multitude of discourses, other beings of all kinds and on many scales, 
and, also, by our physical and cultural environments. Indeed, “matter” itself 
has an “agentic capacity” that influences our daily choices. We exist within 
the movements and meshes of living and non-living energies, from viruses 
and bacteria to weather and economics, even while our talents for technolo- 
gy and cultural constructions have shifted the planet’s flows and climate. 
Agency in the age of the Anthropocene is complex and kaleidoscopic, dis- 
tributed and global. This understanding of agency is one of the framing the- 
ses of the “new materialisms” for which reality emerges from the combined 
energies of vibrant matter (from quantum level to the cosmic), bodies, 
things, and cultural discourses. 
To carry out this study, I examine the works of an author writing at the 
Anthropocene’s dawn, one who expresses the shifting views on the body- 
mind-environment interface at the time when the radical planetary changes 
that we are now experiencing broadly were beginning to gain velocity: Jo- 
hann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832). Goethe, in fact, spoke of moderni- 
ty’s increasing speed as “veloziferisch,” or devilishly fast. He is also ac- 
claimed as the exemplary author of the modern, self-determining subject 
who creates his own destiny. From Werther to Faust, his literary figures stride 
through history and their eponymous texts creating worlds and their futures. 
Or at least that is the standard account of Goethe as major German author 
and shaper of cosmopolitan European modernity. In contrast to that view, I 
suggest that Goethe’s vision – as we note when viewing both his science and 
literature together – documents figures who may believe that they choose 
their own fates yet actually engage in reciprocally determining exchanges with their 
companions and their physical surroundings in a manner best described as 
distributed agency. In other words, Goethe presents human reality as an 
enmeshment within historical culture, local communities, global interactions, 
and, not to be forgotten, multiple scales of natural forces. Discussing how 
these entanglements among culture, physical nature, and intellectual world- 
building interact as part of human “reality” presents a challenge for studies 
of the environment and the human being alike. 
In this essay, I address the question of the “physically” radical reality of 
the age of the Anthropocene as documented in the new materialisms, and 
compare it to the “mentally” radical reality of human consciousness pro- 
posed by Howard Tuttle and explored in this volume.2 Tuttle writes that the 
composition of reality is inevitably altered by the presence of our conscious- 
 
 
2 Howard Tuttle, Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of 
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset (New York: Lang, 2005). 
  
ness perceiving and shaping itself and its surroundings. I juxtapose these 
types of radical reality through the lens of agency: who and what has it, how 
or if it can be directed, and what agency in the age of the Anthropocene 
means for humanity’s “radical reality.” In his Human Life is Radical Reality, 
Tuttle explores how reality and the very matrix of our existence is impacted 
by human consciousness. As human subjects, we are always (only) within 
the range of our consciousness, though we extend our “reality” outwards, 
and so shape ever more of our environment accordingly. Tuttle declares rad- 
ical reality to be the idea that in order for something to be real for human 
beings, 
 
it must somehow appear with and be kept in view of at least one human life. Or- 
tega’s claim that it is the destiny of human beings to ‘humanize the world’ is nei- 
ther an anti-environmental notion nor an anthropocentric one. Human beings 
cannot avoid understanding circumstances in terms of the nature and under- 
standing they actually possess. Even the idea of a non-anthropomorphic envi- 
ronmentalism is in fact a humanization of circumstances by human life itself. We 
cannot avoid imparting meanings and values that are not human meanings and 
values. (Tuttle, p.178) 
 
Tuttle labels our perspective as inevitably human, in that we can see the 
world only through our own eyes and cultural systems. It is not just our 
frame that is altered in the contact, but reality itself is shaped in both direc- 
tions by our “humanizing.” 
Tuttle’s concrete assessment of human reality as being human shares 
with mechanistic views a belief that we human beings can escape our frame 
– bodily, material, ecological – and “transcend.” Tuttle’s radical reality is the 
human ability to have a “voluntary, transcending construction” that is dif- 
ferent from our “biological nature” (Tuttle, p.141). Tuttle thus maintains the 
difference between human reality and the rest of physical reality: 
 
The issue here is the distinction between our life as a voluntary, transcending 
construction, as radical reality, and our life as our biological nature. Our historical 
and fabricated being and our biological being are not identical. Our self- 
transcending and historical being is a denaturalized existence which cannot be 
discerned by exclusive reference to our anatomy, sensations, or physiology […]. 
While our biological existence, of course, is a necessary condition of our life as 
embodied, it is not a sufficient condition to explain our life as radical reality, and 
it is not anything radically real. Our human being is both natural and extra- 
natural; we are thus ‘ontological centaurs.’ Our body, of a given and fixed nature, 
does its work automatically, through biological laws of growth and decay, but our 
extra-natural life as radical reality is not given ready-made or realized according 
to laws; it is achieved in historical time, an existence which accumulates and fab- 
ricates itself toward its own future. (Tuttle, p.141) 
  
Tuttle maintains a line between our “biological existence” and our “self- 
transcending being,” something I question through both Goethe and the 
new materialists. Certainly, our reality is “achieved in historical time, an ex- 
istence which accumulates and fabricates itself toward its own future,” yet 
unlike Tuttle, I follow the new materialist’s assertion that this type of exist- 
ence is pervasive in matter’s widespread creative forces in many forms (Tut- 
tle, p.141). In fact, there is increasing evidence that “reality” is more a ca- 
cophonous and creative symphony of co-emergence including the tones 
from both mind and matter. As John McCarthy writes in his 2006 discussion 
of Goethe and complexity theory in Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in 
Science and Literature (Goethe-Nietzsche-Grass): “Perhaps the creative act alone is 
real. Perhaps all principles of reality are ultimately derivative of the one prin- 
ciple of creative convergence and divergence of inner and outer spaces, of 
matter and mind.”3 
It is significant, therefore, that Tuttle prevaricates most promisingly, de- 
spite generally maintaining the problematic dichotomy of “human biology” 
versus “transcendent ability,” when he emphasizes the requirement of “rela- 
tions” that allow the existence of the two things related: significantly, there 
is therefore no “I,” or human subject, without its world. We may see the world 
through human eyes and exist in a “human reality” which is like no other 
reality, yet this does not happen in a vacuum; the two are fully interdepend- 
ent. Tuttle claims: 
 
Human life remains inseparable from its confrontation with a world which exists 
as something serviceable for the mediation of what hinders or advances it. Nei- 
ther the ‘I’ nor its circumstances can be authentically understood as independent 
‘things in themselves’ which are each independent of the others. […] (T)he ‘I’ and 
its circumstances are always bonded together in a dialectical bipolor relation. This polarity is 
neither the pure ‘outside world’ of realism nor the pure ‘inside world’ of idealism. 
(Tuttle, pp.47-48, emphasis mine) 
 
For Tuttle, experience is always a polarity of things and viewers. His polar- 
ized view is, however, one based on a contrast between “human life” and 
the world “as something serviceable” for it. This tension remains. He never- 
theless emphasizes a bipolar relationship between the individual and its “cir- 
cumstances” that each depends on the other. With the emphasis on the bi- 
polar tension, Tuttle provides fertile ground for our study of the new 
materialisms and questions of agency and the environment in the 
Anthropocene. 
 
 
 
3   John A. McCarthy, Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in Science and Literature (Goethe- 
Nietzsche-Grass) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p.70. 
  
In addressing agency and our physical and mental enmeshment  the scopes 
of “reality,” this paper follows a three-step process: it begins with an 
introduction to the new materialisms and distributed agency. I then briefly 
explore the agency of nature’s “vibrancy” in the debate occurring early in 
the Anthropocene (the age of Goethe is the dawn of this era) between 
“vitalism” and “mechanism” in terms of Tuttle’s notion of radical reality. 
Finally, I use this context to explore Goethe’s optics as a view that, like the 
new materialisms, is grounded in the interactivity of human and non-human 
energies. In sum, I juxtapose the notion of radical reality with the new mate- 
rialisms via Goethe in order to explore the broader implications of human 
and non-human agency in the age of the Anthropocene. 
The “new materialisms” emerge from a wide range of scientific work, the 
social sciences, and the humanities. Unlike traditional Marxist materialism 
that emphasizes economic production as part of a (seemingly inevitable) tel- 
eological development into rather utopian social systems, the new material- 
isms concentrate on the interrelationships of human beings, bodies, and cul- 
tures in terms of patterns of matter and energy, autopoiesis, and complex 
systems including weather, the dissipative structures described by Ilya Prigo- 
gine, and all living beings (and economics, too). This view emphasizes above 
all the agentic capacities of matter in many forms and not just the human 
will. Agency in this context thus indicates the ability to impact and alter the 
surroundings, broadly speaking. Obviously, there is a wide spectrum of 
agentic capacity. The flows of matter and energy with such agentic capacity 
include the powerful weather patterns such as tornadoes and hurricanes, the 
bodily processes of all living things, and the long-term alterations to inor- 
ganic forms as well, including geological forces, the impact action of solar 
energy, and such effects as the fluctuations of electricity in the power grid. 
These all take on a “life of their own,” so to speak, that is outside our con- 
trol. Major works in the new materialisms include Stacy Alaimo’s 2010 Bodily 
Natures and her 2008 jointly edited volume with Susan Hekman, Material 
Feminisms; Karen Barad’s 2010 Meeting the Universe Halfway; Jane Bennett’s 
2010 Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things; Diana Coole’s and Samantha 
Frost’s 2010 volume, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics; Andrew 
Pickering’s 1995 The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, & Science; and Serenella 
Iovino’s and Serpil Oppermann’s literary studies in “material ecocriticism.4 
 
 
4 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 2010), Material Feminisms, ed. by S. Alaimo and Susan Hekman (Bloom- 
ington: Indiana UP, 2008); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics 
and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke UP, 2007); Jane Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke UP, 2010); New Material- 
isms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham: 
  
These works bridge the power of discourses and physical matter, thereby 
contextualizing human activity within broader cultural and natural forces. 
The performative aspects of emerging reality are not limited to human 
linguistic capacity and our consciousness, since our bodily immersion and 
co-entanglements with light and the machinations of our intestinal bacteria, 
for example, are constant. It is not just discourses shaping our bodies and 
behaviors: the type of music playing in the background at the mall apparent- 
ly impacts our shopping choices, the amount of daily sunlight can influence 
our moods, and, more ominously, the hormones introduced into our bodies 
from factory farming practices may be altering the early onset of puberty. 
The list of significant factors altering – literally – our bodies and minds 
grows ever larger in the Anthropocene’s industrial coating of anthropogenic 
matter across the globe. The impact of such medicinal and toxic elements is 
explored at great length in Alaimo’s Bodily Natures; in this essay I look pri- 
marily at the question of light as a part of our bodily environment. One can- 
not argue, after all, that we exist independently from light. We are products 
of solar energy, and it is an ecologically relevant exercise to consider the im- 
plications for our agency. 
I cannot do full justice to the range of ideas from the new materialisms 
here; in brief, I concentrate on the questions of agency with an eye towards 
our participation in broader flows of energy and matter (the downgrading of 
human agency into contextualized interactions) juxtaposed with the im- 
mense impact of humanity during the age of the Anthropocene (upgrading 
our agency as a species). Barad gives us solid ground for thinking about mat- 
ter’s agency: her research in quantum mechanics demonstrates concretely 
how matter is “agentive” and how the “linguistic turn” in scholarship has 
tended to neglect matter itself.5 Building on the physics of Niels Bohr, Barad 
presents a “posthumanist performative” approach to “understanding 
technoscientific and other naturalcultural practices that specifically acknowl- 
edges and takes account of matter’s dynamism” (Barad, p.135). She works 
with optics – like Goethe, but in her case also with electrons and quantum 
particles. This leads her to see matter not as “reflective” (of a subject) but 
rather as “refractive” (dispersed with specific patterns) and agentic in its 
 
 
 
Duke UP, 2010); Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, & Science 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995). See especially the literary application of the new 
materialisms as “material ecocriticism” by Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann in 
their essay “Material Ecocriticism: Materiality, Agency, and Models of Narrativity,” in 
Ecozon@, 3.1 (2012), 75-91, and their volume on Material Ecocriticism (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 2014). 
5 Cf. especially her chapter on “Agential Realism: How Material-Discursive Practices 
Matter,” pp.132-185. 
  
movements: “Matter is neither fixed and given nor the mere end result of 
different processes. Matter is produced and productive, generated and gen- 
erative. Matter is agentive, not a fixed essence or property of things” (Barad, 
p.37). In fact, she writes that: 
 
Matter’s dynamism is generative not merely in the sense of bringing new things 
into the world but in the sense of bringing forth new worlds, of engaging in an 
ongoing reconfiguring of the world. Bodies do not simply take their places in the 
world. They are not simply situated in, or located in, particular environments. Ra- 
ther, “environments” and “bodies” are intra-actively co-constituted. (Barad, 
p.170) 
 
In short, Barad presents what I consider an “ecological” view from 
quantum mechanics, one that puts human beings into matter’s mix of bodies 
and environments constantly reconfiguring each other at varying levels. Ac- 
cording to Barad: “[T]he phenomena produced are not the consequences of 
human will or intentionality or the effects of the operations of Culture, Lan- 
guage, or Power. Humans do not merely assemble different apparatuses for 
satisfying particular knowledge projects; they themselves are part of the on- 
going reconfiguring of the world” (Barad, p.171). This is one aspect of what 
the new materialisms, even the seemingly abstract studies in quantum me- 
chanics, offer current ecocritical explorations of the human-environment 
interfaces: reconfigurations and diffraction are the patterns in which we exist 
and in which we shape our surroundings. In this context, the toxic wastes 
and disasters ensuing in the wake of our “reconfigurations” take on a life of 
their own. Radioactivity, for example, lives on past any master narratives we 
may tell (as Rob Nixon notes in Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the 
Poor, depleted uranium used in many recent American munitions has a half- 
life of 4.51 billion years, thus at a scale that one might only label cosmic).6 
Barad contextualizes our agency within scales such as the quantum that 
we are not typically used to seeing in environmental contexts. Bennett, on 
the other hand, works with more familiar scales of bodies and humanly visi- 
ble objects, yet she similarly declares that agency is distributed. “Agency is,” 
she writes, “distributed across a mosaic” (Bennett, p.38). She also notes, 
however, that human agency is like a bicyclist “riding a bicycle on a gravel 
road. One can throw one’s weight this way or that, inflect the bike in one 
direction or toward one trajectory of motion. But the rider is but one actant 
operative in the moving whole” (Bennett, p.38). 
Energies and vitalities are a “swarm,” or an assemblage, and not part of a 
binary of active subject working with passive matter. Bodies are therefore 
 
 
 
6   Nixon, Slow Violence (2011), p.201. 
  
imbricated in other systems of bodies and matter where they act alongside 
and with others: “bodies enhance their power in or as a heterogeneous assem- 
blage” (Bennett, 23, original emphasis). One may perceive each bodily mo- 
tion as an autonomous decision but that is more a willful overlooking of 
context than an accurate perception. Hence, even our most conscious ac- 
tions are actually, in Bennett’s terms that are typical of the new materialisms, 
“distributed.” “What this suggests for the concept of agency is that the effica- 
cy or effectivity to which that term has traditionally referred becomes dis- 
tributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being a ca- 
pacity localized in a human body or in a collective produced (only) by 
human efforts” (Bennett, p.23). For Bennett, distributed agency is at a bodi- 
ly level, such as the ingestion and digestion of food that our bodies actively 
consume thereby engaging the eaten and the eater in an “eating encounter” 
in which bodies are shown to be but temporary congealments of a materiali- 
ty that is a process of becoming” (Bennett, p.49). 
All living things from human beings to birds, animals, plants, and mi- 
crobes are enmeshed within manifold processes and at multiples scales. Ad- 
ditionally relevant are the food substances inherent to life, solar energy, and 
the ever more omnipresent particles of industrial debris covering the planet 
since the explosion of the Anthropocene. These scales do not eradicate hu- 
man agency but rather contextualize it within our own species and discours- 
es as well as our relation to other species with whom we co-exist. In this 
sense, we are not quite ourselves but rather scales of collectivity coagulated 
into fleshy bodies. This materiality sounds alienating, but it elucidates a vi- 
sion of “shared reality.” As Bennett writes: 
 
Vital materiality better captures an “alien” quality of our own flesh, and in so do- 
ing reminds humans of the very radical character of the (fractious) kinship be- 
tween the human and the nonhuman. My “own” body is material, and yet this vi- 
tal materiality is not fully or exclusively human. My flesh is populated and 
constituted by different swarms of foreigners. The crook of my elbow, for ex- 
ample, is a “special ecosystem, a bountiful home to no fewer than six tribes of 
bacteria […].” (Bennett, p.112, original emphasis) 
 
“Radical reality” in Bennett’s terms is based on the “kinship between the 
human and nonhuman”; and indeed, it is that ecological context to which I 
compare Tuttle’s “radical reality” focusing instead on human consciousness. 
In short, thinking of the environment in terms of the new materialisms 
means finding new grounds on many different scales of our human-matter 
interface. These do not begin and end with the bodily boundaries, but rather 
our bodies are part of the co-emerging flows. 
  
Such ideas about flow and distributed agency are not entirely new, of 
course, and one finds these concepts throughout Western culture and in 
many cultures across the globe. For this particular discussion of human and 
non-human, relevant background can be found the eighteenth- and nine- 
teenth-century Lebenskraft-related debate between “vitalism,” as expounded 
upon by Paracelsus in the sixteenth century in which the four elements are 
themselves active agents, and the “mechanistic” explanations describing all 
non-human life as a machine as per Descartes and Newton. In terms of 
agency, this dichotomy was fierce: the vitalistic explanations suggested that a 
life force akin to a kind of wide-spread agency animated the world, whereas 
the mechanistic views described nature as “mere matter,” a machine moving 
unceasingly according to the laws of physics utterly devoid of agentic capaci- 
ty.7 In the mechanistic view, only human beings and the divine have agency, 
since our “soul” separates us from matter and links us to the divine. Inter- 
estingly, the scientific view drew an ultimate line between passive matter and 
the immaterial (human) soul and so maintained an ultimate distinction be- 
tween human beings and the rest of the world, whereas vitalism more scien- 
tifically, at least in terms of contemporary quantum physics and ecology, in- 
cluded humanity in the mix of the vibrant material world. 
In vitalism, our minds and bodies are more than simple vessels for our 
souls, though the explanations for matter’s energy were often fanciful or 
spiritually based. During the Age of Goethe, romantic “Naturphilosophie” 
sought various unifying principles for the life force, mind, soul, and even 
body, thereby bridging the two sides and revealing the faulty structure of the 
dichotomy.8 Many of these discussions circled around the problem of agen- 
cy; that is, the issue of how life shapes itself and acts on its own terms (or as 
mechanistic enactments of divine directive), and how this relates to human 
activities. As Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine write in the intro- 
duction to Romanticism and the Sciences, this “age of reflection” sought a self- 
understanding based on the “unity of spiritual process in nature and our- 
selves.”9 The more scientific and mechanistic perspectives rejected vitalism’s 
holistic and spirit-based harmonies while also fueling a dualistic and seem- 
ingly paradoxical tendency to assert that our bodies are determined by mate- 
 
 
 
7 Cf. Hartmut Böhme, Natur und Subjekt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Val 
Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason, (London: Routledge, 
2006); and Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revo- 
lution, (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), esp. pp.117-126 and 235. 
8 Cf. Kate Rigby, Topographies of the Sacred: The Poetics of Place in European Romanticism, 
(Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2004). 
9 “Introduction: The Age of Reflexion,” in Romanticism and the Sciences, ed. by Andrew 
Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), pp.1-9 (p.3). 
  
rial laws yet our souls are free. Thus, mechanistic thinkers claimed that there 
is an absolute difference between the human being as a soul-carrier or a ra- 
tional mind, and all other materiality and living beings. In other words, the 
hard-edged scientific knowledge cemented an ultimate (and non-scientific) 
distinction between humanity and the rest of the organic world. 
This mechanistic view is part of the traditional materialism that under- 
stood human beings in isolation from both our environment and our “com- 
panion species,” as Donna Haraway describes the species with which human 
beings co-evolved including our fellow animals, but also bacteria and plants, 
etc.10 As we now realize with greater ecological knowledge, there are very 
troubling implications associated with the belief that human beings are radi- 
cally separate from rest of the biosphere; indeed, the mechanistic model ne- 
glecting the ecological context of the human species is radically insufficient. 
Both Nixon in Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor and Thomas 
Heberlein in Navigating Environmental Attitudes have written poignantly about 
the disastrous social and environmental impact of practices that pretend 
humanity and ecology are two entirely separate categories.11 Although the 
vitalist-mechanistic debates continue in various forms today, the blind spots 
of both views render the dichotomy ineffective for explaining human partic- 
ipation in Earth’s realities, particularly in terms of what we now know from 
such fields as ecological science, quantum mechanics, non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics, complexity theory, animal studies, and all of these in rela- 
tionship to artistic creativity. One might more productively think non- 
dualistically about creativity, mind, matter and reality. As McCarthy writes: 
 
Once we begin to distance ourselves from the binary mode and think comple- 
mentarily – even holistically – we begin to notice linkages previously unsuspect- 
ed. We also come to appreciate the fact that nonlinearity is actually the rule in the 
real world, whether in cloud formations, gypsy moth populations, particle phys- 
ics, our heart rhythms and brain waves – or in enduring works of art. (McCarthy, 
p.271) 
 
In other words, creativity appears to be a shared capacity of bodies, clouds, 
and our minds. In the rest of the essay, I work through the implications of 
interwoven agencies for the radical reality of our consciousness in conjunc- 
tion with the autopoieitic creativity and vibrant “becoming” of the physical, 
ecological, reality of planet Earth through Goethe’s optical lens. 
 
 
 
 
10     Cf. Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Other- 
ness (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2003). 
11    Thomas Heberlein, Navigating Environmental Attitudes (New York: Oxford UP, 2012). 
  
This philosophical strand emphasizing emergence from relations preceding 
the things related resonates with Barad’s views on quantum mechanics. From 
the bridging work of the romantics and Goethe continuing through con- 
temporary ideas in complexity, chaos theory, quantum mechanics, non- 
equilibrium systems, networks, environmental thinking, postmodern litera- 
ture and the arts, etc., we find models of “relationality” that overcome such 
dichotomies.12 McCarthy echoes and updates Goethe in terms of chaos the- 
ory with the assertion that: “At the center of rumination is the creative act in 
both nature and the arts. The chief hypothesis is the belief that science and 
the arts are interrelated via deep structures” (McCarthy, p.14, emphasis mine). 
These deep structures in both the natural world and in the arts are shared 
energies and, according to the new materialisms, they express agentic capaci- 
ties beyond the human. This is not revived vitalism based on spirituality or a 
“vital force,” but rather a contextualization of human abilities within a liv- 
ing, growing environment constantly shaped by complex flows of energy 
and matter. In this sense, reality is an ongoing emergence of relations amongst 
creative patterns. The radical reality of humanity is not dissolved into these 
motions but rather a supplemental extension infused with, and related to, 
other earthly processes. 
Goethe’s work reflects similar ideas regarding human activities. He was 
never entirely bound to a dichotomy of realism versus idealism, and, indeed, 
his science and literature bridge such artificial divides. Particularly in his op- 
tical works but also throughout his science, as Ingrid Dzialas writes, Goethe 
sees human beings engaging with “elementary natural phenomena,” like col- 
ors, in terms of interactive processes, rather than as an “active” mind pro- 
cessing “passive” nature.13 Taming the mind to avoid hasty assumptions and 
 
 
12    I explore these in terms of non-equilibrium thermodynamics elsewhere; see Heather 
I. Sullivan, “Affinity Studies and Open Systems: A Nonequilibrium, Ecocritical Read- 
ing of  Goethe’s Faust.”  In: Ecocritical Theory:  New  European Approaches,  eds.  Axel 
Goodbody and Kate Rigby (Charlottesville: U of Virginia Press, 2011), pp.243-255. 
13 In Ingrid Dzialas’s Auffassung und Darstellung der Elemente bei Goethe, (Berlin: Ebering, 
1939), she describes Goethe’s sense of relationship to the elements as an “Einheits- 
gefühl.” Of air, she writes that Goethe “weiß genau, daß er von der Atmosphäre ab- 
hängig ist – und er will es auch nicht anders. Wie ein mystisches Erlebnis durch- 
schauert ihn diese Erkenntnis. Er hat das Gefühl, als ob die ganze ihn umgebende 
Welt in ihn eindringe und mit ihrem Sein sein eigenes Sein erfülle. Bei keinem Ele- 
ment hat Goethe das tatsächliche Ineinandergehen, die Einheit zwischen Mensch 
und Außenwelt so stark empfunden wie bei der Luft. Eine engere Verbindung kann 
es nicht geben. In der Luft und von der Luft leben wir und reagieren im höchsten 
Grade auf sie” (p.43). (Goethe ‘knows precisely that he is dependent on the atmos- 
phere – and he does not wish it to be otherwise. Like a mystical experience, this 
knowledge thrills him. He feels as if the entire surrounding world infiltrates him and 
fills his own essence with its essence. With no other element did Goethe perceive so 
  
to allow the natural phenomena to emerge on their own terms, to renounce 
the false belief in mastery, is one of Goethe’s primary goals in all of his sci- 
ence and one that permeates his literary work as well. Dennis Sepper’s book- 
length comparison of Goethe’s work to Newtonian systems clearly outlines 
the Goethean methodology in which one “ought to let things speak for 
themselves.”14 Those who are aware and sensitive enough to allow them- 
selves to see and flow with nature’s patterns will most readily be able to ex- 
plain them, since nature’s patterns and our own being and vision are deeply 
related, as McCarthy and Astrida Tantillo also explain.15 Goethe’s work from 
early in the Anthropocene offers a view exploring our shared material partic- 
ipation in physical reality like all living things, even as he struggles simulta- 
neously to maintain the sense that we human beings are also absolutely 
unique, as is typical to humanism. In other words, Goethe provides an ex- 
cellent example of work that connects the traditional, subject-centered hu- 
manism, and ideas similar to those of the contemporary work in the “new 
materialisms,” that emphasize non-human forms of agency or agentic capac- 
ity as the context for our own bodily and intellectual environments and ac- 
tions. 
Goethe’s figures in Werther engage with, and are shaped by, cultural and 
natural forces outside their control, including class expectations, thunder 
storms, and flooding rivers; in Faust with literary traditions, cosmic pacts be- 
tween the Lord and Mephistopheles, witches’ brew, sexual desires, water 
nymphs, and the elements of fire, water, air, and the earth; and in die Novelle 
and Das Märchen with lions and tigers, gold, unruly giants, uncontrolled 
shadows, mysterious vegetable debts, and the antics of will o’ wisps, to men- 
tion a few. We human beings are in the mix of elements, in other words. 
Gernot Böhme describes how Goethe inscribes the human being from with- 
in nature, so that we, too, are “Naturwesen”: 
 
Der Erkennende, der Mensch, ist Naturwesen, und er kennt deshalb die Natur 
von innen heraus, wir würden heute sagen: aus der Teilnehmerperspektive. Die- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strongly the concrete infusion, the unity of human and outer world, as he did with 
air. There cannot be a closer connection. In the air and from the air we live and react 
to the greatest extent.’) 
14     Dennis Sepper, Goethe contra Newton: Polemics and the Project for a New Science of Color, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988), p.3. 
15     Cf. McCarthy, esp. his chapter 5 on Faust; and Astrida O. Tantillo, The Will to Create: 
Goethe’s Philosophy of Nature (Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 2002). 
  
ser Gedanke ist allerdings bis heute nicht ausgedacht und in seinen Erkenntnis- 
möglichkeiten nicht im entferntesten ausgeschöpft.16 
 
(The perceiver/knower, the human being, is a natural being, and s/he thus 
knows nature from the inside out. Today, we would call this seeing from the par- 
ticipant’s perspective. This thought has not, through today, been fully thought 
through and has not been by any means exhausted in its full potential for percep- 
tual/knowledge possibilities” [translation mine].) 
 
Furthermore, in Goethe’s many scientific writings, he details a very clear 
emphasis on the interactive processes of the human “subject” and the ob- 
served world or object. The observer must temper her impulses and let “na- 
ture” or, in the case of Goethe’s optical treatise, Zur Farbenlehre, the colors 
and light, emerge on their own terms. The elements of color and light, as 
well as water, fire, earth, and air and other non-human factors have signifi- 
cant influence in Goethe’s works, so much so that they appear to have 
“agentic” capacities. One might say, for example, that water determines 
much of Faust’s fate as he battles against the sea with his dike, uses the wa- 
ter nymphs to accomplish victory against the “other Kaiser,” and when he 
faces the putrid swamp in his final moments. Even his final “ascent” into 
the heavens looks a lot like the flow of water rising with warm air, as I dis- 
cuss elsewhere.17 With this kind of distributed agency among humans and 
non-humans, Goethe’s works are similar to the new materialisms and their 
emphasis on the active impact, or “vibrancy” and creativity of matter, as 
Jane Bennett describes it, in which we partake rather than lead from “out- 
side.” 
For Goethe, our sensory connection to the material world, “nature,” 
most strongly arises from our visual perception, from sight. In his optical 
works, Zur Farbenelehre and Beiträge zur Optik, Goethe’s description of vision 
is representative of the interface of mind and matter. Goethe criticizes New- 
ton’s famous optics for numerous reasons including Newton’s (correct) the- 
ory that white light contains all the spectrum of colors, which Goethe be- 
lieves was based on “faulty logic.” That is, Goethe (with, in this case, 
significant insight) insists that colors emerge only when light interacts with 
objects and eyes; whereas Newton sees the colors in terms of light itself (it is 
a matter of light’s pure essence). Goethe’s colors are specifically interactive: 
 
 
 
 
16 Gernot Böhme, “Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale. Goethes Methode der Naturbe- 
trachtung,” in Goethe: Ungewöhnte Ansichten, ed. by Karl Richter and Gerhard Sauder 
(St. Ingbert, Germany: Röhrig UP, 2001), pp.9-21 (p.15). 
17 Heather I. Sullivan, “Ecocriticism, the Elements, and the Ascent/Descent into Weather 
in Goethe’s Faust,” Goethe Yearbook, 17 (2010), 55-72. 
  
Newton begeht hierbei den Fehler, den wir schon früher gerügt haben, und den 
er durch sein ganzes Werk begeht, daß er nämlich das prismatische Bild als ein 
fertiges unveränderliches ansieht, das es doch eigentlich immer nur ein werden- 
des und immer abänderliches bleibt.18 
 
(Newton makes hereby the mistake that we earlier rebuked, and that he makes 
throughout his entire work; namely that he sees the prismatic image as final and 
unchanging. It, however, only ever occurs as something always becoming and 
always changing [translation mine].) 
 
Colors and all of nature – including human beings – are always “becoming” 
and changing according to Goethe. Science must work within this frame- 
work of emergence rather than in an ultimate divide with an objective, out- 
side observer and solid, fixed object. Things in Goethean terms have a more 
agentic capacity than Newton’s view of light as an object of physics with 
specific and straightforward characteristics. Goethe rejects specifically the 
mechanistic model here, as Walter Heitler asserts in his discussion of the 
Farbenlehre.19 
Additionally, Goethe tends to describe nature, eyes, and colors as inter- 
active, intertwined relations rather than isolated objects. Tuttle’s “relations” 
between the “I” and the world are similar, but his stress of the humanly in- 
flected “radical reality” leans more heavily towards our consciousness than 
to the broader scope of physical interactivity. Goethe describes such interac- 
tivity at many levels and in many forms, including the polarity of dark and 
light, and the co-shaping of eyes and colors, all of which are always experi- 
enced in conjunction with objects. He sees nature and eyes as fully interre- 
lated, and the form of human perception as emerging from the fundamental 
polarity of dark and light. Newton thinks of light itself, as something in iso- 
lation, rather than in terms of its relations to the rest of the world as Goethe 
preferred: “Newton scheint vom Einfacheren auszugehen, indem er sich 
bloß an’s Licht halten will; allein er setzt ihm auch Bedingungen entgegen so 
gut wie wir, nur daß er denselben ihren integrierenden Anteil an dem Her- 
vorgebrachten ableugnet” (FL, p.304). (Newton appears to proceed from 
the simpler [starting point] in that he wants to address only light. However, 
he also subjects it to conditions just as we do, only that he denies their as- 
similative impact on the result” [translation mine]). 
 
 
 
18 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Zur Farbenlehre, ed. Manfred Wenzel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klassiker, 1991), p.337. Future references to this work are made parenthetical- 
ly, labelled “FL.” 
19 Walter Heitler, “Goethean Science,” in Goethe’s Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Na- 
ture, eds. David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc (New York: State U of New York P, 
1998), pp.55-69. 
  
Note that Goethe insists we include our own impact on the process and 
results in the scientific understanding. In this, he speaks with contemporary 
quantum physics and the new materialists who see an emergent reality 
shaped by material and human interactions. Frank Schweitzer speaks in this 
regard of Goethe’s “aktives Mitwerken des Erkennenden”20 [“active partici- 
pation of the perceiver/knower”]: 
 
Der Erkenntnisprozeß ist also durchaus auf das aktive Mitwirken des 
Erkennenden angewiesen. Erkenntnis hier ist kein Akt bloßer Konstruk- 
tion, sondern schließt auch einen nicht-konstruierbaren, nur erlebbaren 
Teil mit ein, der sich auf Genuß und Empfindung bezieht.” (Schweitzer, 
p.390) 
 
(The perceptual/knowing process is related fully to the active participa- 
tion of the perceiver/knower. Perception/knowledge is here no act of 
simple construction, but rather includes also a piece that is not able to be 
constructed, only able to be experienced, and that relates to enjoyment and 
sensation” [translation mine]). 
 
To ignore the act of perception and observation in science is, in Goethe’s 
phrase, an example of Newton’s “Gewalt des Selbstbetruges” and 
“Unredlichkeit” (violence of self-deception and unspeakableness) (FL, 
p.315). 
Goethe condemns Newton’s refusal to acknowledge the role of the ob- 
server and the broader context. In McCarthy’s terms, his “main objection to 
Newtonian optics, for example, was Newton’s failure to include the observ- 
ing subject in his calculations and the conditions of the experiment itself. 
Above all, Goethe criticizes a perceived tendency toward microreduction 
which leads to the loss of the broader context of the isolated part studied.”21 
Michael Böhler similarly stresses Goethe’s rejection of the Newtonian divi- 
sion between “Mensch und Natur,” describing how Goethe believed that 
Newtonian methods are destructive and cannot lead “zur Wahrheit” (to 
truth).22 Goethe critiques the isolated and static quality of a Newtonian uni- 
 
 
20 Frank Schweitzer, “Naturwissenschaft und Selbsterkenntnis,” in Goethe und die Verzeit- 
lichung der Natur, ed. Peter Matussek (Munich: Beck, 1998), pp.383-398 (p.390). 
21 John A. McCarthy, “’The Pregnant Point’: Goethe on Complexity, Interdisciplinarity, 
and Emergence,” in Herbert Rowland, ed., Goethe, Chaos, and Complexity (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2001), pp.17-31 (p.26). 
22 Michael Böhler writes: “Es ist nun diese der wissenschaftlichen Methodik eigene 
Trennung von Mensch und Natur sowie der Isolation des Subjekts und des Intellekts 
von ihrem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang, es ist diese abstrahierende ‚Scheidekunst‘, 
welche Goethe für höchst verderblich hält. Denn auch wenn sie nur instrumentellen 
Charakter haben sollte, auch wenn sie nur Mittel zum Zweck der Wissensvermehrung 
wäre--: für Goethe bedeutet das Verfahren einen verhängnisvollen künstlichen Bruch 
  
verse, devoid of becoming and without human impact on the process of ob- 
servation. 
If Newton sees the process of perception as final and complete, it is, in 
contrast, only so for a brief moment in Goethe’s vision. In fact, Goethe sees 
eyes as themselves creative. The ability to become, develop, and create is 
distributed among colors, eyes, colored things, lights, and human beings. 
This is not to assign agency randomly among objects and organs, nor to as- 
sert that we determine the full scope of creativity. Instead Goethe asserts a 
co-creativity of humans and nature. The eyes and the thing perceived partic- 
ipate in exchanges based on fundamental relatedness as interactive process- 
es. Goethe writes of the eyes’ creativity: “Dieses Organ [das Auge] ist immer 
in der Disposition, selbst Farben hervorzubringen, und genießt einer 
angenehmen Empfindung, wenn etwas der eignen Natur Gemäßes ihm von 
außen gebracht wird” (This organ (the eye) is always capable of bringing 
forth colors itself, and it enjoys a pleasant sensation when something com- 
patible with its own nature is presented to itself.) (FL, pp.247-248; transla- 
tion mine). The eyes and the colors, in other words, are fully interrelated; we 
do not come to nature as an outsider but rather as part of the natural sys- 
tems, or as Böhme states, with a “Teilnehmerperspektive” (participatory 
perspective). Sepper comments on the interactive process of perception typ- 
ical to Goethe’s science, and notes that it is fully based on this sense of rela- 
tionships and coordination with the phenomena emerging as part of the vis- 
ual process itself. Hence the Goethean process is predominantly experiential 
(that is, empirical), not theoretical. Goethe, he notes, understands truth as 
residing “less in propositions than in experience, less in statements about 
nature than in the adequacy of one’s approach to it” (Sepper, p.184). Goethe 
strives for an “adherence to a way (method) that corresponds to and ampli- 
fies the encounter of human beings with nature” (Sepper, p.184). 
In that we are now working within an acknowledgement of the 
Anthropocene, and the highly “amplified” encounter of human beings and 
the rest of the world, this attention to how human beings correspond to na- 
ture – that is, how we resonate with and against our vibrant surroundings – 
 
 
im Zusammenhang zwischen Mensch und Natur.” (It is this separation typical to the 
scientific methodology that divides human from nature and that isolates the subject 
and the intellect from its original context, it is this abstracting ‘art of division,’ which 
Goethe considers highly destructive. In that even when it supposedly has only an in- 
strumental characteristic, or only serves as means to an end for the goal of increasing 
knowledge, this process means for Goethe a fateful, artificial break of the connection 
between humans and nature.) “Naturwissenschaft und Dichtung bei Goethe,” in Goe- 
the im Kontext: Kunst und Humanität, Naturwissenschaft und Politik von der Aufklärung bis zur 
Restauration, ed. Wolfgang Wittkowski, (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), pp.313-339 
(p.333). 
  
is all the more relevant. Indeed, Sepper’s phrase of “amplifying the encoun- 
ter” takes on a new, more disturbing meaning in this context. The more we 
achieve “correspondence” and so understand our enmeshment in the world, 
the more, it seems, that we also attempt to “amplify” energy flows and gra- 
dients in ways that benefit us in the short term. Our very success is an am- 
plification that cannot continue without limits, ecologically, and without ex- 
ponential impact on the biosphere. Goethe’s insights are that we “amplify” 
from within instead of “mastering from without.” This may not change our 
behavior but it certainly helps us understand it. 
The human agent can attain a high level of accuracy in perception and 
assessment of the colors and natural world by acknowledging the creativity 
and interactivity of the things around her. This “accuracy” pertains to per- 
ception for Goethe, but not only there. It is, in fact, his formula for great 
art: to see the world as it develops and “becomes” and to seek to replicate 
and converge one’s own genius with respect to “nature’s” creative acts. This 
strategy holds both for the individual education and for the artist. Self- 
restraint is not so much a monastic exercise of deprivation as it is an ability 
to merge creative energies with the surrounding forces and patterns, and to 
benefit from their wisdom rather than only to impose ourselves onto the 
world: whether our surroundings be composed of fellow thinkers, nature’s 
creativity, or matter’s basic forms in plant growth, the shimmering colors, or 
the flows of water and the movements of the earth. As Frederick Amrine 
notes, this process of creative perception/interaction is as much about the 
metamorphosis of things as it is the “metamorphosis of the scientist.”23 
Above all, one must attempt to line up one’s vision with the “natural order,” 
which agentically emerges if one only will allow it to do so instead of impos- 
ing oneself blindly onto the world (as Newton does, according to Goethe’s 
vituperative critiques). Goethe stresses repeatedly that one must carry out 
scientific and poetic studies in a natural order. Newton fails, because he car- 
ries out “seine Versuche nicht in einer natürlichen Ordnung, sondern auf 
eine künstlich verschränkte Weise” (his experiements not in a natural order, 
but rather an aritificially limited manner) (FL, p.422; translation mine). This 
natural order is a key to his work: the sequence of descriptions and devel- 
opment of ideas is central. 
Because of Goethe’s typical emphasis on “natural order,” the structural 
sequence of the Farbenlehre is itself of great significance. Goethe divides his 
treatise into three parts: the explanation of colors themselves; the critique of 
Newton’s optics; and the historical development of optics and color studies. 
 
 
23 Frederick Amrine, “The Metamorphosis of the Scientist,” in Goethe’s Way of Science: A 
Phenomenology of Nature, ed. by David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc (New York: State U 
of New York P, 1998), pp.33-54. 
  
Each section contextualizes the other. In the first section on the colors, he 
also has three parts: the physiological, or colors belonging to the “eye”: the 
physical colors relating to the interaction of light on the surface of an object 
such as shimmering mother of pearl; and the chemical colors deriving from 
the color-absorbing matter of the objects seen. Goethe begins therefore 
with the eye (or human brain, as we now realize) engaging with light, then 
moves to interaction of light with surfaces and objects, and closes with un- 
changing colors of objects as they appear when light shines on them. Each 
step is part of our engagement among eyes, light, and/or objects rather than 
of things themselves in isolation. 
Above all, Goethean optics are based on relations and interactions: “In 
der ganzen sinnlichen Welt kommt alles überhaupt auf das Verhältnis der 
Gegenstände untereinander an, vorzüglich aber auf das Verhältnis des 
bedeutendsten irdischen Gegenstandes, des Menschen, zu den übrigen” (In 
the entire sensory world, everything depends entirely on the relationship of 
the objects among each other, particularly however on the relationship of 
the most meaningful of earthly objects, the human being, to the others.) 
(FL, p.83; translation mine.). Repeatedly, he stresses the interactions and 
“relations,” or the “Beziehungen”: “Immer bleibt es aber auch hier die 
Hauptsache, daß die Beziehungen wahrhaft eingesehen werden” (The main issue 
here is always that the relations are truthfully seen) (FL, p.182). Here is where 
he draws the major distinction between his own optics and those of Newton 
who sees only colors and not light acting in space with objects, not to men- 
tion the actual process of visual perception. 
I am not arguing that Newton was wrong, but rather that his view, as 
part of the mechanistic divide between human beings and the environment, 
is itself in need of context, at least in terms of the new materialisms and eco- 
logical thinking. In this sense, Goethe’s somewhat (in)accurate yet revolu- 
tionarily contextualizing optical studies are worth recalling. For Goethe, 
Newton’s inward focus eliminates the equally significant interactions and 
relations that place humanity – the observers – in the polarity of light and 
dark. Similarly, light is always contextualized in relation to the surroundings 
and not a stand-alone entity. Goethean science, in sum, posits exchanges 
and polarities as the basis of the physical world, and we as perceiving beings 
in the realm of light are fully within these processes. There is some continu- 
ation of traditional humanism in the sense that Goethe understands human 
beings as the “most meaningful earthly object” (“der bedeutendste irdische 
Gegenstand”), and yet Goethe maintains an emphasis on our perception and 
awareness of reality in terms of light, colors, and the other aspects of the 
physical world. Our agency is not isolated from the workings of solar ener- 
gy, in other words. Goethe’s entire optical opus rests upon the assertion that 
  
only in a relational understanding of interactions does reality emerge. His 
polarity is not passive objects manipulated and seen by active subjects but 
rather active matter across the spectrum. In terms of radical reality, this 
shifts the emphasis from the human consciousness to the interactive ex- 
changes of many forces cohering into forms – diffraction patterns, waves, 
and spirals – of distributed agency. 
Goethe thus provides us with an access point for understanding both the 
changing ideas of modernity at the beginning of the Anthropocene in terms 
of the human-material interfaces, and a bridge to the contemporary discus- 
sions in the new materialisms. Not just vitalistic or animistic musings, Goe- 
the’s science (re)animates the world with both human and non-human agen- 
cies. His interdisciplinary views based on life-long scientific interests and 
towering literary accomplishments provide a bridge to the new materialisms 
and their similarly cross-disciplinary notion of vibrant nature. I utilize the 
study of “radical reality” to help us rethink what exactly we mean with “en- 
vironment” and reality broadly. In particular, the study of the era 1770-1830 
is a study of the early Anthropocene: the very era when science disassociates 
human beings from the material world while simultaneously enabling the 
much more rapid impact on the Earth’s ecological systems with the industri- 
al revolution and the emerging age of fossil fuels. For this reason, my focus 
on ecocriticism and Goethe does not favor scenic landscapes and charis- 
matic mega-fauna (or their devastation, or even environmental justice) but 
rather emphasizes the effort to disturb what we take to be our “human” and 
separate foundation from the rest of the planet. The task is to study how our 
bodies, minds, and cultures are imbricated into material systems and vice 
versa. Perhaps paradoxically, the more knowledge we gain about our utter 
dependency on ecological functioning, the more we assert that we can tech- 
nologically transcend in our capacity as “master” who functions outside the 
system. Tuttle’s assertion that we can “transcend” our biological body is 
troubling in this context. It is therefore an important exercise to imagine and 
explore both narratives and scientific studies that document just how fully 
we are enmeshed within the solar-powered biosphere and part of the light- 
life-energy-matter cycles therein. That optics and color studies – especially 
the role of light – can thus be “ecological” is particularly relevant in the age 
of fossil fuels now known as the Anthropocene. 
In conclusion, it must be said that Goethe is not – avante la letter – a 
strictly “green” or environmental writer per se. Many of his texts, like The 
Sorrows of Young Werther, do include what we now term nature writing that 
express clear enthusiasm for nature’s wonders. But nature writing itself does 
not necessarily prompt a re-thinking of humanity’s relation to ecological sys- 
tems. Indeed, Goethe’s position at the brink of the Anthropocene meant 
  
that he could only partly see the extent of coming changes. Nevertheless, his 
Farbenlehre clearly takes a stance immersing us materially and physically in 
our world of light in a way that resonates with the new materialists’ efforts 
to reshape our understanding of agency as a joint event of both the human 
and non-human. This Goethe does from “within” the world, as Böhme’s 
term “Teilnehmerperspektive” suggests. Analogous to the new materialisms, 
Goethe’s optical studies prompt us to look beyond the sublime scenery, in- 
teresting animal species, and water-air-soil nexus apparent in contemporary 
ecology studies. Thus he offers convenient access to understanding the early 
Anthropocene. With the goal of making visible a broad spectrum of the dif- 
fracted and distributed agencies actually in play, this essays offers an alterna- 
tive to a concept of radical reality based solely on human consciousness. The 
radical reality of the Anthropocene consists of the many proliferating human 
and non-human agentic capacities – caused, in part, by the release of fossil 
fuels into the atmosphere – that radiate around the planet. We are inextrica- 
bly bound up with that radically creative reality. 
